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SOVEREIGN DEBT SYMPOSIUM
Setting the Scope of and the Limits to
the Incremental Approach to Sovereign
Debt Restructurings
Anyone interested in legal issues surrounding sovereign debt should pay careful attention
to the last special edition of the Yale Journal of International Law in which a framework is
set forth to ensure the progressive development of orderly sovereign debt restructurings
(SDRs). This prospective agenda relies upon a principles-based approach to SDR that
revolves around various soft-law instruments, such as UNCTAD Principles on Promoting
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, as well as its Roadmap and Guide on
Sovereign Debt Workouts, the UN General Assembly resolution 63/319 on Basic
Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes and the UN Human Rights Council
Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights.
While I must admit that I was initially sceptical about the relevance and the utility of
those (sometimes overlapping) instruments, the proposed incremental approach to SDRs
crafted by Bohoslavsky and Goldmann is particularly convincing. It undoubtedly
constitutes to date the best alternative to an unfeasible legally binding statutory
framework to sovereign bankruptcy and an appropriate complement to the still
insufficient contractual approaches with new model Collective Actions Clauses (CACs).
“Incremental” in the sense that it seeks a progressive development of the law and to
influence decision makers in the long-run, the suggested approach also aims to be
holistic in its scope. Its underlying objectives are both to overcome the persistency of a
so-called “private law paradigm” , which doesn’t take into account public interest
objectives (such as debt sustainability) in sovereign debt disputes, as well to better
consolidate these nascent international regimes and to better coordinate them with
other fields of international (or transnational) law. Within this framework, in my view, this
ambitious project prompts three questions about its limits and its scope that were not
specifically dealt with in this symposium: (1) uncovered areas deserving to be integrated
into the project, (2) the necessity to tailor the implementation of SDR imperatives and (3)
their – sometimes questionable – influence on rules of sovereign immunity.
Uncovered areas
The various soft law instruments dealing with SDRs that have been adopted these past
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few years already encompass a large number of topics. However, some may wonder
whether more could be done to ensure a greater comprehensiveness of the discipline.
For instance, Daniel D Bradlow’s article highlights the insufficient integration of business
and human rights standards into SDRs and identifies gaps regarding the identification of
the human rights responsibilities of creditors.
To some extent, the same could be said of international financial standards devised under
the auspices of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), notably those adopted by the Basel
Committee or the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO). For
instance, the decisions taken by credit rating agencies have proven to significantly
influence sovereign debt markets and to have precipitated the Greek debt crisis (see for
instance here and here). However, the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit
Rating Agencies does not incorporate any specific discipline related to sovereign debt
and, for example, the circumstances in which rating agencies should refrain from acting
in ways that could generate sovereign insolvencies or compromise SDRs. Only the EU has
so far adopted limited rules addressing the specificities of unsolicited sovereign ratings
through Regulation 462/2013 (see also my analysis here). One can also query whether
there is some inconsistency between the UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, for which “a lender is responsible to make a realistic
assessment of the sovereign borrower’s capacity to service a loan” (Principle 4), and the
Basel Committee prudential standards, which almost treat sovereign debt as being
roughly equivalent to risk free and even encourage financial institutions to hold such
assets (see here). It thus seems necessary to ensure better linkages between international
financial regulation and the promotion of the SDR agenda.
Tailoring the implementation of the SDR agenda
Another important issue to be discussed concerns the way in which the SDR agenda is
taken into consideration within the framework of the development of new domestic or
international instruments. For instance, the few existing pieces of anti-vulture legislation
are not of the same scope and are not necessarily applicable to all restructuring
processes. This is the case of the UK Debt Relief Act of 2010 that only applies to 36 States
participating in the IMF/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC).
With Greece and Argentina not being eligible for the HIPC initiative, the two largest SDRs
in history would have not benefited from the protection offered by this legislation. While
it is understandable that the adoption of such a legislation was subject to significant
political constraints, it is important to note that it only partially takes into account the
imperatives for orderly SDRs.
An example of tailored implementation of the SDR agenda is to be found in some of the
latest international investment agreements and, more specifically, in the EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Instead of entirely excluding
sovereign debt from the definition of covered investments (such as in the model India BIT
(article 1.7) or the model Colombia BIT (article 2.1)), the specificity of CETA lies in the
choice to exclude only the admissibility of investment arbitration claims when it involves
“a restructuring of debt of a party” (See Annex 8-B of CETA).
Interestingly, the text of CETA shows that both parties have adequately drawn the lessons
from the unfortunate experiences of both the Greek and Argentinean SDRs, so as to
prevent holdout litigation through investment claims disrupting sovereign restructurings.
Annex 8-B indeed provides that a “negotiated restructuring” is defined as “(a) a
modification or amendment of debt instruments, as provided for under their terms” (e.g.
through CACs), “including their governing law” (e.g. through retroactive CACs like in the
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Greek case) or “(b) a debt exchange or other similar process in which the holders of no
less than 75 per cent of the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt subject to
restructuring have consented to such debt exchange or other process” (e.g. in the
absence of CACs like in the Argentinean case). Annex 8-B nonetheless provides that
claims based on SDRs are admissible in case of violation of national treatment or most
favoured nation treatment, thereby implementing the principle of equitable treatment
that “imposes on States the duty to refrain from arbitrarily discriminating among
creditors” (UNGA Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes, Principle
5).
Adverse effects on sovereign immunity
The UK anti-vulture funds legislation is an example of an incomplete but still useful
implementation of SDR agenda in domestic law while CETA provides an example of a
tailored implementation in an international agreement. It should nonetheless be noted
that taking into account SDR imperatives also requires a careful analysis and, more
particularly, an assessment as to whether such an approach does not more generally
affect the legal framework applicable to situations that have no nexus with sovereign
insolvency. In that respect, the issue of sovereign immunity is particularly telling.
Immunity from execution is an efficient tool to block holdout litigation. In that respect,
the UNGA Basic Principles provide that “sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and
execution regarding sovereign debt restructurings is a right of States before foreign
domestic courts and exceptions should be restrictively interpreted” (Principle 9).
Likewise, The UNCTAD Roadmap includes several similar references (see pp. 5, 58, 59).
When assessing the legality of enforcement measures sought by holdout creditors in the
past years, some domestic courts have interpreted very restrictively customary rules of
sovereign immunity so as to prevent the seizure of state property. It was for instance the
case in France and Belgium where supreme courts considered that the way in which the
waiver of immunity of execution included in Argentinean bonds was drafted did not allow
for the seizure of assets (see here my analysis of NML v. Argentina before French courts).
Without going into the technical details, it is worth pointing out that domestic courts did
not take into consideration the existence of holdout creditors. They have rather
developed new restrictive standards governing foreign sovereign immunity applicable to
all enforcement measures, including those related to other types of liabilities such as
arbitral awards, damages for torts or compensation to be paid to embassy employees.
Holdout litigation has played a significant role in the evolution of the rules of sovereign
immunity – recalling in some jurisdictions the doctrine of absolute immunity prevalent a
century ago –  even when they are applied in cases not involving sovereign debt. The
suggested incremental approach to SDRs should therefore duly take into consideration
the adverse effects that it might more broadly have on general international law.
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